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THE POWER OF SUGGESTION: 
CAN A JUDICIAL STANDING ORDER DISRUPT A NORM? 
Kimberly A. Jolson* 
Visualize a judge.  Is she donning a black robe?  Is she sitting on the 
bench in her courtroom?  Is she rendering her decision in an important 
case? 
Historically, the study of the judicial role has been almost universally 
centered on this sort of “in-court” behavior.  And rightly so.  The top 
judicial function is to adjudicate disputes.  But that is not all they do. 
Increasingly, attention is being paid to judges’ extrajudicial expressions 
or their messaging.  One very important way in which judges express 
preferences—and, at times, requirements—concerning how cases 
proceed before them is through judicial standing orders.  Standing orders 
range from the mundane, like page limits for briefs,1 to the extraordinary, 
like offering sentencing credit to inmates in exchange for their 
sterilization.2  The proliferation of standing orders cannot be overstated.  
They have become a fixture in nearly every courthouse across the country.  
Yet, they remain under the radar.  Indeed, little case law has developed 
regarding their boundaries, and even less has been done to study their 
effects. 
This Article considers the impact, if any, of a particular judicial 
standing order that encourages behavior by simply expressing a 
preference.  The results of the study have implications for how judges 
themselves should think about their standing orders and how we all 
understand judicial power. 
And, even more generally, this Article presents the question of whether 
the bald expression of a judicial preference can disrupt a norm.  For 
decades, legal scholars like Cass Sunstein, Lawrence Lessig, and Richard 
McAdams all—in their own ways—have argued that law has an 
expressive function and, through that expression, law has power.3  Over 
 
* United States Magistrate Judge for the Southern District of Ohio.  This Article, in its original form, was 
submitted as a requirement for the degree of Masters of Law in Judicial Studies at Duke University.  I 
thank my advisor, Professor Mitu Gulati, for his guidance and inspiration.  I also thank Matt Jolson for 
his consummate support and fortuitous understanding of statistics. 
 1.  See, e.g., Judge Eric F. Melgren, United States District Court for the District of Kansas, 
Standing Order regarding page Limitations for Memorandums and Briefs, available at 
http://ksd.uscourts.gov/index.php/guideline-order/standing-order-regarding-page-limitations-for-
memorandums-and-briefs-melgren/ (last visited July 31, 2019). 
 2. Colin Dwyer, Judge Promises Reduced Jail Time if Tennessee Inmates Get Vasectomies, NPR 
(Jul. 21, 2017), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/07/21/538598008/judge-promises-
reduced-jail-time-if-tennessee-inmates-get-vasectomies. 
 3. See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, The New Chicago School, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 661, 673 (1998); 
Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903 (1996); Richard H. McAdams, 
1
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twenty years ago, Sunstein posited that norms, defined as “social attitudes 
of approval or disapproval, specifying what ought to be done and what 
ought not to be done,” can be government managed.  In support, he 
declared that laws “make a statement about how much, and how, a good 
or bad should be valued[.]”  More recently, McAdams built upon this 
work and deeply analyzed two of law’s expressive powers:  the ability to 
coordinate and to inform, which, McAdams asserts, supplements law’s 
force.4  As this Article will show, judicial standing orders are a useful tool 
to analyze these concepts. 
This Article proceeds as follows.  To begin, Section I reviews norm 
literature at a very high level and explains the norm of sending more 
senior lawyers to court.  Section II gives to an overview of what standing 
orders are and how they operate. This section also summarizes the 
relatively sparse case law governing standing orders and explores the 
legal limits judges face in enforcing standing orders. 
Section III provides the background of the particular standing order 
under study.  Recently, the American Bar Association (“ABA”) resolved 
to urge courts to implement plans that welcome opportunities for newer 
lawyers in the courtroom.5  Section III provides this history and also offers 
examples of the different standing orders at work in this area.  
Importantly, Section III notes the feeling, at least among some judges, 
that the bench has a responsibility to ensure that the younger generation 
of lawyers is ready to lead.  This Section lays the groundwork for the 
question of whether a court’s practices impact party choices and lawyer 
behavior—an important concept this Article seeks to study.  At a more 
granular level, this Section identifies and compares four types of new-
lawyer participation standing orders: (1) a standing order that simply 
encourages new-lawyer participation;6 (2) one that makes opportunities 
available for new lawyers because the judge hears arguments when she 
otherwise wouldn’t;7 (3) a  hybrid—it encourages new-lawyer 
participation and also notes a willingness to hear from more than one 
lawyer if that enhances new-lawyer participation;8  and (4) an ad hoc 
 
An Attitudinal Theory of Expressive Law, 79 OR. L. REV. 1 (2000); see also ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, 
ORDER WITHOUT LAW 1 (1991). 
 4.  RICHARD H. MCADAMS, THE EXPRESSIVE POWERS OF LAW 4-5 (2015). 
 5.  A.B.A. Resolution 116 (adopted August 14-15, 2017). 
 6.  McAdams, supra note 4. 
 7.  See, e.g., Judge Christopher Burke, United States District Court for the District of Delaware, 
Standing Order Regarding Courtroom Opportunities for Newer Attorneys (Jan. 23, 2016), available at 
https://www.ded.uscourts.gov/sites/ded/files/StandingOrder2017.pdf. 
 8.  Judge Gray H. Miller, United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, Court 
Procedures (Sept. 16, 2015), available at 
https://www.txs.uscourts.gov/sites/txs/files/procedures%20with%20att%20forms.pdf(“In those instances 
where the court is inclined to rule on the papers, a representation that the argument would be handled by 
a young lawyer will weigh in favor of holding a hearing.”). 
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approach whereby a judge, in a particular case, makes her expectation 
clear that less-experienced lawyers will be seen and heard in the 
courtroom.9  Relying on Section II’s analysis, Section III explores 
potential legal concerns of the different variations of the standing orders.10  
Most critically, it explains why an order encouraging, rather than 
mandating, is preferable under current case law and why it is useful for 
studying the broader question of societal compliance.  It is also a way to 
examine law’s expressive powers. 
Section IV is the heart of the Article.  It examines the effects of the 
order that simply encourages participation.  The United States District 
Court for the District of Massachusetts is noteworthy because more than 
half of the active District Judges have implemented the standing order 
encouraging new-lawyer participation.  I have collected six data sets.  The 
first two sets are a comparison of the experience level of lawyers 
appearing at initial scheduling conferences during the six months before 
and the sixth months after implementation of the order by two District 
Judges.  The next data set is a comparison of the experience level of 
lawyers appearing before a District Judge to argue civil motions during 
the six months before and the six months after implementation of the 
standing order.  The next three data sets include data about the lawyers 
appearing before these District Judges for the first half of 2019. 
Section V summarizes the findings, makes suggestions for how to craft 
standing orders, and advocates for more study. 
II. NORMS AND COURTROOM PARTICIPATION 
Precisely defining a “norm”—what it is and whether it exists—is 
perilous business.  Thoughtful scholars have offered related definitions, 
but most would agree with McAdams’s description that norms are 
“informal social regularities that individuals feel obligated to follow 
because of an internalized sense of duty, because of a fear of external non-
 
 9.  See, e.g., In re Generic Digoxin and Doxycycline Antitrust Litig.222 F. Supp. 3d 1341 
(J.P.M.L. 2017), (noting, in a price-fixing multidistrict litigation, that “the Court expect[ed] that the 
leadership [would] provide opportunities for attorneys not named to the PSC, particularly less-senior 
attorneys, to participa[te] meaningfully and efficiently in the MDL, including through participation in any 
committees within the [Plaintiffs’ Steering Committee] and in determining which counsel will argue any 
motions before the Court.”); see also Case Specific Order Re: Oral Argument, GSI Technology Inc. v. 
United Memories, Inc., Case No. 5:13-cv-01081-PSG(Mar. 9, 2016) (“[T]he court expects that each party 
will allow associates to present its arguments on at least two of the six motions to be heard. If any party 
elects not to do this, the court will take its positions on all six motions on the papers and without oral 
argument.”). 
 10.  Some of the criticism of the orders relates to the use of the orders to increase women and 
minority participation in courtroom.  Although an interesting issue, this paper does not explore those 
questions. 
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legal sanctions, or both.”11  For his part, Lawrence Lessig has explained 
that norms “regulate”:  They “frown on the racist’s joke,” “they tell the 
stranger to tip a waiter at a highway diner,” and they “constrain” behavior 
“not through the centralized enforcement of a state,” but “because of the 
enforcement of a community.”  In other words, norms lean on people to 
behave in a certain way, and the thread among this scholarship is that a 
norm is more than just a behavioral regularity—a norm brings with it a 
sense of what ought to be done. 
 For the past half-century, legal scholars have explored norms in 
numerous and disparate contexts.  Robert Ellickson (now) famously 
studied Shasta County ranchers’ informal dispute resolution process.12  
Cass Sunstein and others investigated the dueling culture of early 
America,13 and Mark West delved into the informal structures governing 
sumo wrestling in Japan.14  As part of this field of study, scholars also ask 
how norms change.  Sunstein has observed that criticism plays an 
important role in norm change, and opinion leaders who aim to shape 
norms—whom he calls “norm entrepreneurs”—can bring about sudden 
change.15 
 This leads to the question this Article presents.  The expectation 
that the wet-behind-the ears lawyer is not the one standing up in court—
especially federal court—fits many of the definitions of a norm.  This is 
so not only because it is what regularly happens, but also because it is 
what people believe ought to happen.  Indeed, it is expected that the gray-
haired lawyer addresses the judge and argues the case.  Can a judicial 
standing order that baldly expresses a preference, without threat of 
sanction, lead to norm change in this space?  In Sunstein’s words, can 
judges act as “norm entrepreneurs” via their standing orders and effect 
change? 
II. UNDERSTANDING STANDING ORDERS 
To appreciate whether standing orders have the ability to disrupt a 
norm—and whether the particular standing order under study in fact 
did—a few words about standing orders are first needed. 
 
 11.  Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH. L. 
REV. 338, 340 (1997) (offering this definition as a coalescence of the new school thought). 
 12. Robert C. Ellickson, Of Coase and Cattle: Dispute Resolution Among Neighbors in Shasta 
County, 38 STAN. L. REV. 623, 623 (1986). 
 13.  C.A. Harwell Wells, The End of the Affair? Anti-Dueling Laws and Social Norms in 
Antebellum America, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1805 (2001). 
 14.  See Mark D. West, Legal Rules and Social Norms in Japan's Secret World of Sumo, 26 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 165 (1997). 
 15.  Sunstein, supra note 3, at 909. 
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A. Case Law 
Although case law explaining the boundaries of standing orders in the 
federal system is relatively light, certain themes have emerged.  First and 
foremost, standing orders (both by the district and by an individual judge) 
can be an appropriate exercise of a court’s inherent authority over 
management of its cases and control of the courtroom.16  In United States 
v. Ray, the United States argued that a standing order requiring the U.S. 
Attorney to assemble information required by the PROTECT Act to be 
submitted to the Sentencing Commission contravened Congress’ intent 
under the statute and exceeded the district court’s authority.17  The Ninth 
Circuit disagreed.  The Court found the standing order in line with the 
relevant statute but additionally concluded that the court’s power derived 
from its “inherent authority to regulate the practice of litigants before it,” 
which permitted the court to implement the standing order.18 
Despite this inherent authority, standing orders may be found improper 
if they are inconsistent with statutes or the national rules, like federal 
procedural rules.  The Second Circuit’s decision in Commercial Cleaning 
Services, L.L.C. v. Colin Servo Systems, Inc., provides an example of a 
standing order that, according to the Second Circuit, went too far.19  The 
United States District Court for the District of Connecticut had adopted a 
standing order requiring a plaintiff in a RICO action to submit a case 
statement within 20 days of bringing the action.  The case statement was 
to provide “in detail information” like “the names of the individuals, 
partnerships, or other legal entities constituting the RICO enterprise, the 
dates of the predicate acts with a description of the facts surrounding the 
predicate acts, and the identity of the alleged wrongdoers and victims.”20  
The district court had relied on this standing order, at least in part, to 
dismiss the plaintiff’s RICO claims because the plaintiff provided 
“insufficient information.”21  The Second Circuit found this troubling: 
We consider first the theory of insufficient information. For at least two 
reasons, dismissal for insufficient information was not justified. First, the 
Standing Order calls for information far in excess of the essential 
 
 16.  See, e.g., United States v. Ray, 375 F.3d 980, 992 (9th Cir. 2004) (upholding standing order 
requiring U.S. Attorney to assemble information required by PROTECT Act to be submitted to the 
Sentencing Commission was upheld as a proper exercise of “the court’s inherent authority to regulate the 
practice of litigants before it”). 
 17.  Id. 
 18.  Id. at 993. (“Courts have (at least in the absence of legislation to the contrary) inherent 
power to provide themselves with appropriate instruments required for the performance of their duties.” 
(citing In re Peterson, 253 U.S. 300, 312 (1920))). 
 19.  271 F.3d 374, 386 (2d Cir. 2001). 
 20.  Id. at 385. 
 21.  Id. 
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elements of a RICO claim. On a motion for summary judgment, or for 
judgment as a matter of law at the time of trial, a defendant would not be 
entitled to judgment because the plaintiff's evidence failed to include all 
the “individuals, partnerships, corporations, associations, or other legal 
entities [that constitute] the RICO enterprise,” or the identities of all 
“wrongdoers” and “victims.” To the extent the Standing Order called for 
presentation of information going beyond what a plaintiff needs to present 
to establish a legally sufficient case, plaintiff's inability to produce it could 
not justify the grant of judgment to defendant. 
A standing order of this nature may appropriately require a plaintiff to 
set forth the information it possesses in helpfully categorized form, as an 
aide to the court and to the accused defendant. But it may not make the 
prosecution of the action dependent on the plaintiff's ability to furnish 
more information than is required, as a matter of law, to prove the 
essential elements of the claim.22 
As an aside, the Second Circuit went on to criticize the district court 
for disallowing discovery.23  But, important for this Article’s purposes, 
the Second Circuit was clear that a judicial officer cannot use a standing 
order to expand substantive legal requirements beyond what the law 
requires. 
In addition, courts have expressed concern about the lack of notice and 
public participation in the implementation of standing orders.24  This 
concern is unsurprising.  Of course, fairness requires litigants to know the 
rules governing them.  And a preference for a notice-and-comment period 
allows for feedback. 
Relatedly, standing orders may go a step too far if they impose 
inflexible standards that do not accommodate the particular needs of a 
case.  The First Circuit addressed this issue in In re Fidelity/Micron 
Securities Litigation, concluding that the district court's standing order on 
allocation of costs “raises a core concern: it does not leave sufficient room 
for individualized consideration of expense requests.”  In that matter, the 
First Circuit considered a standing order stating that, as a matter of 
practice, prohibited reimbursement of certain categories of expenses 
absent “exceptional circumstances.”25  The First Circuit concluded that 
the standing order raised a “core concern” that it did not leave “sufficient 
 
 22.  Id. at 385-86; see also United States v. Zingsheim, 384 F.3d 867, 871 (7th Cir. 2004) 
(application of standing order found to be improper because it was used to defer downward departure 
decisions when deferral was not authorized by Rule 35). 
 23.  Id. at 386. 
 24.  See, e.g., In re Fidelity/Micron Sec. Litig., 167 F.3d 735, 737 n.1 (1st Cir. 1999) (“[W]e 
urge the district courts to avoid incipient problems of this type by incorporating standing orders into local 
rules, or, at least, making them readily available in the office of the Clerk of the district court.”).  
25.  Id. at 736. 
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room for individualized consideration of expense requests.”26 
In sum, standing orders can be a permissible exercise of a court’s 
inherent authority over the management of its docket and courtroom.  But, 
predictably, standing orders that conflict with national rules or statutes are 
frowned upon.  Similarly, the ways in which standing orders are adopted 
and implemented matter.  Most importantly, notice to litigants is required, 
and a comment period is preferable. 
B. Standing Orders In Context 
Given these procedural and substantive limitations, standing orders 
occupy a unique space within the law—especially the type of standing 
order this Article studies.  Here’s why.  As McAdams concisely 
summarizes, the two conventional accounts of legal compliance are 
deterrence and legitimacy.27  The first account, which economists tend to 
favor, holds that legal sanctions change the cost of behavior by making 
compliance cheaper than noncompliance.28  The second account is 
legitimacy.29  In short, people are more likely to obey the law when the 
law is viewed as a legitimate moral authority.30  The law’s legitimacy is 
particularly important in the absence of a moral consensus.  When that is 
the case, law might be able to leverage its legitimacy to persuade the 
public to change their moral view, and, in turn, their behavior.31 
Although McAdams gives these accounts their due, he posits that while 
sanctions and legitimacy generate most of legal compliance, these 
theories cannot explain everything.  McAdams’ concern is the rest.  He 
theorizes that “law has expressive powers independent of the legal 
sanctions threatened on violators and independent of the legitimacy the 
population perceives in the authority creating and enforcing the law.”32  
He identifies two expressive mechanisms, coordination and information, 
which round out law’s causal powers.33  First, the law coordinates 
behavior by making a particular outcome salient.34  Borrowing from game 
theory, McAdams calls this the “coordinating focal point” for behavior.35  
Second, law reveals information.  In McAdams’ words, law has 
informational content that reflects the values of the laws’ creators.  “These 
 
 26.  Id. at 737. 
 27.  McAdams supra note 4, at 2. 
 28.  Id. 
 29.  Id. at 3. 
 30.  Id. 
 31.  Id. 
 32.  Id. at 6–7 (italics omitted). 
 33. Id. at 7. 
 34. Id. at 22. 
 35. Id. 
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new beliefs can change an individual’s behavior, usually in the direction 
of greater compliance, though sometimes less compliance and sometimes 
in ways orthogonal to compliance.  In short, law provides information; 
information changes beliefs; new beliefs change behavior.”36  These 
expressive mechanisms explain laws’ ability to spur compliance when 
deterrence and legitimacy fail to account for it all.  As an example, 
McAdams turns to “tribunals successfully resolving disputes despite 
lacking any power to sanction the disputing parties.”37  To demonstrate 
this, McAdams and Tom Ginsburg have studied compliance rates with 
International Court of Justice decisions.38  Even without the ability to 
sanction noncompliance, ICJ decisions enjoy prompt compliance sixty-
eight percent of the time.39 
Back to standing orders.  As explained above, judges are limited in how 
far they can reach with standing orders.  Judges’ ability to sanction 
noncompliance is limited—if not completely curtailed—in certain 
instances.  So when judges foray into areas over which they have little 
power, they must rely on other forces to induce compliance.  And while 
the judiciary generally is seen as legitimate,40 its legitimacy is shakier 
when it acts beyond its authority.  One, hopefully extreme, example will 
suffice.  When Judge Sam Benningfield, a Tennessee general sessions 
judge for White County, Tennessee, issued a standing order offering 
reduced drug sentences to defendants in exchange for agreeing to long-
term contraception, he received nearly universal criticism.  The local 
district attorney, calling the long-term contraception decision “personal 
in nature,” said that those decisions are  “something the court system 
should not encourage or mandate.”41  A spokesperson for the American 
Civil Liberties Union stated “judges play an important role in our 
community—overseeing individuals’ childbearing capacity should not be 
part of that role.”42  In other words, many stakeholders viewed the 
standing order as illegitimate.  Given this, judges’ legitimacy is at a low 
point when judges adopt standing orders that are seen as beyond their 
realm of authority.  As such, legitimacy alone cannot explain why 
compliance occurs when judges issue standing orders that reach beyond 
their power to enforce. 
One final point.  The theory of laws’ expressive powers as causal 
 
 36. Id. at 136 (italics omitted). 
 37. Id. at 7. 
 38. Id. at 91, 120–21. 
 39. Id. at 91. 
 40. This of course is not always true.  See, e.g., Sheriff Joe Arpaio guilty of contempt for ignoring 
order to stop racial profiling,  THE GUARDIAN (July 31, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/us-
news/2017/jul/31/joe-arpaio-convicted-contempt-immigration-patrols. 
 41.  Dwyer, supra note 2.  
 42. Id. 
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mechanisms are not set up to displace deterrence and legitimacy.  
McAdams instead advocated “theoretical pluralism” about compliance.43  
It is from this view that the paper proceeds.  The paper seeks to answer 
whether laws’ expressive powers of coordination and information might 
explain, in part, compliance with standing orders. 
C. Will the Junior Lawyer Please Stand Up?: 
Attempts to Disrupt a Norm 
As noted, the ABA resolved to urge courts, specifically judges, to 
implement plans that welcome opportunities for newer lawyers in the 
courtroom.44  The resolution notes that “[i]n light of the diminishing 
opportunities available for newer lawyers to develop their litigation skills 
in a courtroom setting,” the ABA “support[s] the proper development of 
the future generation of lawyers.”45  To that end, the ABA has called upon 
stakeholders to take action.  With respect to the judiciary, the resolution 
expressly identifies judicial standing orders that promote newer lawyers’ 
active involvement in litigation and, more specifically, in the courtroom.46 
The ABA’s resolution was years in the making.  Beginning over a 
decade ago, several judges around the country began adopting some 
version of a “Young Lawyers in the Courtroom Program.”  In the past 
couple of years, more and more judges have adopted such orders.47  At 
least among some judges, there is a feeling that the bench has a 
responsibility to ensure that the younger generation of lawyers is ready to 
lead.48  The Honorable Rebecca Pallmeyer perhaps described this 
sentiment best: 
There’s a general feeling on the bench that getting young lawyers 
comfortable and active in court is part of our responsibility.  Our first goal 
always is to do justice, and whether that means granting a summary 
judgment motion or settlement, so be it.  But we do recognize the need and 
desirability of having an experienced trial bar, and that includes younger 
lawyers to be bar leaders of the future.49 
While they may not know it, the judges adopting these orders are 
 
 43. McAdams, supra note 4.   
 44. A.B.A. Resolution 116 (adopted August 14-15, 2017). 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. See, e.g., id.; Judge James Donato, United States District Court for the Northern District of 
California, Standing Order for Civil Cases before Judge James Donato (Jan. 5, 2017), available at 
https://northerndistrictpracticeprogram.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/2017-01-05-Standing-Order-
For-Civil-Cases-Befo.pdf. . 
 48. Erin Coe, An Endangered Art: Can the Legal Industry Keep Trial Advocacy Alive?, LAW360 
IN-DEPTH (Mar. 13, 2017), https://www.law360.com/articles/899956. 
 49. Id. 
9
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attempting to disrupt a norm.  Specifically, the judges are trying to 
redefine the role of junior lawyers.  As Sunstein has said, “[o]ften law 
tries to redefine roles.”50  In 1996, he provided the examples of the law 
saying “that husbands may not rape their wives; that absent fathers owe 
duties of support to their children; that disabled people have certain rights 
of access to the workplace.”51 All of these measures,” Sunstein explains, 
“can be seen as attempts to create new or better norms to define the 
relevant roles.52  So too with judicial standing orders. 
1. Types of Standing Orders to Encourage Junior-Lawyer Participation 
The judicial standing orders targeting junior-lawyer participation take 
many forms, but their purpose is the same: to encourage junior lawyers 
(most often defined as having fewer than between four and seven years of 
experience) to have opportunities to be heard in court.  Although only 
illustrative—and certainly not exhaustive—four different types of orders 
are described below. 
The first type makes opportunities available for new lawyers because 
the judge is more amenable to hearing argument than she otherwise would 
be.53  Judge Burke of the United States District Court for the District of 
Connecticut adopted a standing order that shows how this works. 
The Court notes the “growing trend” of “fewer cases going to trial” and 
that, when they do, “there are generally fewer opportunities “in court for 
speaking or ‘stand-up’ engagements.”  The standing order goes on to state 
that the issue is particularly acute for newer lawyers, defined as attorneys 
practicing for seven years or less.”  Because of the importance of “the 
development of future generations of practitioners through courtroom 
opportunities,” the standing order provides:  
(1) After a motion is fully briefed, either as a part of a Request for Oral 
Arguments, or in a separate Notice filed thereafter, a party may alert the 
Court that, if argument is granted, it intends to have a newer attorney argue 
the motion (or a portion of the motion). 
(2) If such notice is provided, the Court will: 
 A. Grant the request for oral argument on the motion, if it is at all 
practicable to do so. 
 B. Strongly consider allocating additional time for oral argument 
beyond what the Court may otherwise have allocated, were a newer 
attorney not arguing the motion. 
 C. Permit other more experienced counsel of record the ability to 
 
 50. Sunstein, supra note 3, at 923. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. See, e.g., Burke supra note 7. 
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provide some assistance to the newer attorney who is arguing the 
motion, where appropriate during oral argument.54 
Of note, Judge Burke’s standing order provides caveats.  First, “[a]ll 
attorneys, including newer attorneys, will be held to the highest 
professional standards,” and they must be “adequately prepared and 
thoroughly familiar with the factual record and the applicable law, and to 
have a degree of authority commensurate with the proceeding.”55  Second, 
the court notes that, at times, it may not be appropriate for a newer lawyer 
to argue a motion, and the Court “draws no inference from a party's 
decision not to have a newer attorney argue any particular motion before 
the Court.”56  Third, the Court “will draw no inference about the 
importance of a particular motion, or the merits of a party’s argument 
regarding the motion, from the party’s decision to have (or not to have) a 
newer attorney argue the motion.”57  Orders like Judge Burke’s confer a 
benefit on the party for compliance, namely an increased chance to be 
heard. 
The second type of standing order states that a judge will change her 
practices if a more junior lawyer participates in a case.  For example, a 
judge may encourage junior-lawyer participation through a willingness to 
hear from more than one lawyer if that enhances junior-lawyer 
participation.58  Judge William Alsup does just that by “relax[ing]” the 
one-lawyer-per-witness rule “to allow young lawyers a chance to 
perform.”59  Judge James Donato, Northern District of California, has a 
standing order that states that he will “extend motion argument time” for 
junior lawyers appearing before him.60  Again, these types of standing 
orders confer a benefit. 
The third approach is case specific.  The judge makes her expectation 
clear, in a particular matter, that less-experienced lawyers will appear in 
the courtroom.61  Judge Grewal took this option in GSI Technology Inc. 
 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Miller, supra note 8.(“In those instances where the court is inclined to rule on the papers, a 
representation that the argument would be handled by a young lawyer will weigh in favor of holding a 
hearing.”). 
 59. Judge William Alsup, United States District Court for the Northern District of California, 
Supplemental Order to Order Setting Initial Case Management Conference in Civil Cases Before Judge 
William Alsup (Jan. 11, 2016), available at www.cand.uscourts.gov/filelibrary/192/JuryTrials1.pdf. 
 60. Donato, supra note 47. 
 61. See, e.g., In re Generic Digoxin and Doxycycline Antitrust Litig., 222 F. Supp. 3d 1341 
(J.P.M.L. 2017), (noting, in a price-fixing multidistrict litigation, that “the Court expect[ed] that the 
leadership [would] provide opportunities for attorneys not named to the PSC, particularly less-senior 
attorneys, to participa[te] meaningfully and efficiently in the MDL, including through participation in any 
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v. United Memories, Inc.62  In an entertaining order, he explained the 
current state of affairs.  “In a technology community like ours that prizes 
youth—at times unfairly—there is one place where youth and 
inexperience seemingly comes with a cost:  the courtroom.”63  Judge 
Grewal then posed the question, “[W]ho will try the technology cases of 
the future, when so few opportunities to develop courtroom skills 
appear?”64  He decided to be part of the solution.65  Six post-trial motions 
were set for argument at the point in the litigation, and Judge Grewal 
“expect[ed] that each party [would] allow associates to present its 
arguments on at least two of the six motions to be heard.”66  Failure to do 
so would forfeit the chance for oral argument.67  Said plainly, the parties 
faced an adverse consequence for not allowing an associate to argue—
oral argument would be cancelled.68 
The fourth and final example simply expresses a judge’s preference 
that more junior lawyers appear.  The order provides neither a carrot nor 
a stick, but the judge “strongly encourages the participation of relatively 
inexperienced attorneys in all court proceedings.  Such attorneys may 
 
committees within the [Plaintiffs’ Steering Committee] and in determining which counsel will argue any 
motions before the Court). 
 62. Case Specific Order Re: Oral Argument, GSI Tech. Inc. v. United Memories, Inc.,  5:13-cv-
01081-PSG (Mar. 9, 2016) (“[T]he court expects that each party will allow associates to present its 
arguments on at least two of the six motions to be heard. If any party elects not to do this, the court will 
take its positions on all six motions on the papers and without oral argument.”). 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. (noting judicial promotion of junior-lawyer participation). 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. This order has an interesting post-script.  The parties forfeited argument—rather than 
allow associates to argue—and stipulated to have the motions decided on the briefs.  See Case Specific 
Order Re: Parties’ Stipulation to Vacate Hearing, GSI Tech. Inc. v. United Memories, Inc., 5:13-cv-
01081-PSG (Mar. 11, 2016).  Judge Gewal expressed his displeasure:   
The day before last, I expressed my concerns about the lack of courtroom opportunities for law firm 
associates in intellectual property cases like this one. Recognizing the court’s own important role in 
encouraging clients and partners to give up the podium once in a while, I asked that each party give 
associates the chance to argue just two of six motions set for hearing on Monday.  This morning, the 
parties and their counsel responded. But rather than confirm their commitment to this exercise, the parties 
jointly stipulated simply to take all motions off calendar and submit them without any hearing. No 
explanation was given; perhaps associate preparation and travel costs were the issue. In any event, once 
again, another big intellectual property case will come and go, and the associates who toil on it will largely 
do so without ever being heard.  I appreciate that my order acknowledged the possibility that the parties 
would decline this opportunity and simply submit their motions on the papers. But I would be remiss if I 
did not observe the irony of another missed opportunity to invest in our profession’s future when two of 
the motions originally noticed for hearing seek massive fees and costs. To be clear, GSI asks for 
$6,810,686.69 in attorney’s fees, $1,828,553.07 in non-taxable costs and $337,300.86 in taxable costs, 
while UMI asks for $6,694,562 in attorney’s fees, $648,166 in expenses and $302,579.70 in taxable costs. 
That a few more dollars could not be spent is disappointing to me. My disappointment, however, is 
unlikely to compare to the disappointment of the associates, who were deprived yet again of an 
opportunity to argue in court. 
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handle not only relatively routine matters (such as scheduling conferences 
or discovery motions), but may also handle, where appropriate, more 
complex matters (such as motions for summary judgment or the 
examination of witnesses at trial).”69  This Article studies an order of this 
sort.  Interestingly, without sanction for noncompliance, we have a real-
world test of whether expression is enough to disrupt a norm. 
2. A Standing Order Without Teeth 
As mentioned earlier, this Article studies the effect, if any, of a 
particular standing order that expresses a judicial preference for 
encouraging junior lawyer participation.  As of this writing, over half of 
the District Judges of the United States District for the District of 
Massachusetts have adopted such an order, and the standing orders the 
judges have adopted are nearly identical.  Given this uniformity, the 
District of Massachusetts was fertile ground to see if this standing order, 
which baldly expresses a preference, has had any impact.  Of note, the 
studied standing order neither provides a benefit for compliance nor 
threatens sanctions for noncompliance.  Instead, it does the exact opposite 
by making an appeal.  It acknowledges the decline in courtroom 
opportunities, recognizes the importance of developing future generations 
of practitioners, and then calls upon counsel to join the court in 
effectuating this important policy.70  Thus, the order is unequivocal in 
expressing a preference without sanctions for noncompliance.  One of the 
judges’ orders goes so far to say that she knows her “standing order is not 
self-executing.”71  But the order reveals information about the judge’s 
preference.  In McAdams’ words, it signals an attitude.  The basic claim 
of the attitudinal model is that law reveals attitudes.72  And the standing 
order used by these judges reveals their attitude about the experience level 
of the lawyers whom they want to see appearing before them. 
Turning to the United States District Court for the District of 
Massachusetts, some background information is useful.  The District’s 
territorial jurisdiction includes the Commonwealth of Massachusetts with 
 
 69. Judge F. Dennis Saylor IV, United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts, 
Standing Order Re: Courtroom Opportunities for Relatively Inexperienced Attorneys (Aug. 12, 2014), 
available at 
https://www.mad.uscourts.gov/boston/pdf/saylor/StandingOrderReCourtroomOppor_Bostonupdate.pdf. 
 70. See, e.g., Judge Indira Talwani, United States District Court for theDistrict of Massachusetts, 
Standing Order Re: Courtroom Opportunities for Relatively Inexperienced Attorneys (Oct. 9, 2015), 
available at https://www.mad.uscourts.gov/boston/talwani.htm.   
 71. Judge Denise J. Casper, United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts, 
Standing Order Re: Courtroom Opportunities for Relatively Inexperienced Attorneys (May 16, 2011), 
available at http://www.mad.uscourts.gov/boston/casper.htm. 
 72. McAdams, supra note 4. 
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three seats of court:  Boston, Springfield, and Worcester.  Eleven active 
District Judges serve the Court.  Judge F. Dennis Saylor was one of the 
first judges in the country to adopt an order addressing junior-lawyer 
participation.  He first did so in 2005 along with Magistrate Judge Charles 
B. Smartwood.  Then, on November 2, 2006, Judge Saylor along with 
then-Magistrate Judge Timothy S. Hillman adopted a “Standing Order 
Regarding Courtroom Opportunities for Relatively Inexperienced 
Attorneys.”  The standing order provides in full: 
 Courtroom opportunities for relatively inexperienced attorneys, 
particularly those who practice at larger firms, have declined precipitously 
across the nation in recent years. That decline is due to a variety of factors, 
but has been exacerbated by the proliferation of rules and orders requiring 
the appearance of “lead” counsel in many court proceedings. 
 In an effort to counter that trend, the undersigned District Judge and 
Magistrate Judge, as a matter of policy, strongly encourage the 
participation of relatively inexperienced attorneys in all court proceedings. 
Such attorneys may handle not only relatively routine matters (such as 
scheduling conferences or discovery motions), but may also handle, where 
appropriate, more complex matters (such as motions for summary 
judgment or the examination of witnesses at trial). The following cautions, 
however, shall apply. 
 First, even relatively inexperienced attorneys will be held to the 
highest professional standards with regard to any matter as to which 
experience is largely irrelevant. In particular, all attorneys appearing in 
court are expected to be appropriately prepared, regardless of experience.  
For example, any attorney who is arguing a motion for summary judgment 
is expected to be thoroughly familiar with the factual record and the 
applicable law. 
 Second, all attorneys appearing in court should have a degree of 
authority commensurate with the proceeding that they are assigned to 
handle. For example, an attorney appearing at a scheduling conference 
ordinarily should have the authority to propose and agree to a discovery 
schedule and any other matters reasonably likely to arise at the conference. 
 Third, relatively inexperienced attorneys who seek to participate in 
evidentiary hearings of substantial complexity, such as examining a 
witness at trial, should be accompanied and supervised by a more 
experienced attorney, unless leave of Court is granted otherwise.  Counsel 
are encouraged to seek additional guidance from the Court in particular 
cases concerning the scope or application of this policy. 
Other district judges in Massachusetts followed suit:  Judge Denise J. 
Casper on May 16, 2011;73 Judge Indira Talwani on October 9, 2015;74 
 
 73. Casper, supra note 71.  
 74. Talwani, supra note 70. 
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Judge Leo T. Sorokin on March 15, 2017;75 and Judge Mark G. 
Mastroianni on May 3, 2017.  And, unsurprisingly, Judge Hillman 
continued to use the standing order when he became a district judge in 
2012.76  Thus, as of May 2017, six of the eleven active district judges in 
the District of Massachusetts had adopted the order.77 
To study the effect of the standing order, I used minute entries from the 
Federal Judiciary’s Case Management/Electronic Case Files (“CM/ECF”) 
system.  A minute entry includes an abundance of useful data like the 
presiding judge, date of proceeding, proceeding type, proceeding 
summary, and (most of the time) attorneys present.  Here is an example 
of a minute entry of a status conference that Judge Saylor held in a habeas 
matter: 
The minute entries that report which lawyers were present allow for 
tracking the experience levels of the lawyers appearing before the judges 
in the District of Massachusetts.  The first point of investigation was to 
see if the adoption of the standing order had any immediate effect upon 
the experience level of the lawyers appearing before the court.  Collecting 
 
 75. Judge Leo T. Sorokin, United States District Court for the  District of Massachusetts, 
Standing Order Re: Courtroom Opportunities for Relatively Inexperienced Attorneys (Mar. 15, 2017), 
available at http://www.mad.uscourts.gov/boston/sorokin.htm. 
 76. Judges Timothy S. Hillman & Leo T. Sorokin, United States District Court, for theDistrict 
of Massachusetts, Standing Order Re: Courtroom Opportunities for Relatively Inexperienced Attorneys 
(Nov. 2, 2006),  available at http://www.mad.uscourts.gov/worcester/hillman.htm. 
 77. At the time, that represented half of the district judges.  Judge George O’Toole, Jr. took 
senior status on January 1, 2018, so now six of eleven district judges have adopted the standing order. 






















Petition for Writ 

















Electronic Clerk's Notes for proceedings held before Judge F. Dennis 
Saylor, IV: Status Conference held on 1/14/2019. Case called. Colloquy re: 
underlying matter in Barnstable. Court reviews the show cause deadline. 
No further status set at this time. COPY MAILED. (Court Reporter: Lee 
Marzilli at leemarz@aol.com.)(Attorneys present: L. Mathews (VC) E. 
Badway) (Pezzarossi, Lisa)  
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data from when Judge Saylor adopted his first order in 2005 proved 
difficult because the Federal Judiciary’s CM/ECF system was in its 
infancy at that time.  Minute entries from Judge Sorokin’s proceedings 
were also unhelpful for my purposes because his docket entries generally 
do not include which attorneys were present. And Judge Hillman has no 
“before implementation” period because he has always used the order as 
a district judge.  
Now the good news.  The minute entries for proceedings before Judges 
Casper, Talwani, and Mastroianni for the six-month periods before and 
after implementation of the standing orders were accessible, complete, 
and useful.  A review of the minute entries shows that Judges Casper and 
Talwani generally conduct their own initial scheduling conferences.  
Comparing who appeared at initial scheduling conferences before and 
after implementation of the standing order makes sense for three primary 
reasons.  First, an initial scheduling conference is held in nearly every 
case and is fairly routine.78So it is as close as possible to comparing apples 
to apples.  Second, the standing order expressly provides “scheduling 
conferences” as an example of a “routine matter[]” that a more junior 
lawyer could handle.79  Third, it is rare for dispositive issues to be 
resolved at initial scheduling conferences so it is a proceeding that better 
lends itself to allowing a more junior lawyer to appear.  Said more bluntly, 
it is a proceeding where a party or a more senior lawyer would be more 
willing take a risk and send a less experienced attorney.  For these reasons, 
initial scheduling conferences seemed a like an appropriate proceeding to 
analyze. I thus complied the data for the lawyers appearing at initial 
scheduling conferences before Judges Casper and Talwani for six months 
before and six months after each judge adopted the standing order. 
Judge Mastroianni is different in that he does not conduct initial 
scheduling conferences in his cases; he leaves that to the Magistrate Judge 
assigned to the case.  So I complied information about the lawyers 
appearing before Judge Mastroianni in any civil proceeding for the six-
month period before and the six-month period after implementation of the 
standing order. 
III. THE DATA 
Two sets of data are analyzed below.  The first shows the immediate 
impact of the standing orders, and the second explores the orders’ longer-
term effects. 
 
 78. See generally Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 16 (permitting pretrial conference and requiring a 
scheduling order in every case unless exempted) 
 79. Hillman & Sorokin, supra note 76 (“Such attorneys may handle not only relatively routine 
matters (such as scheduling conferences or discovery motions) . . . “) 
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A. Immediate Effects?:  The Data Six Months Before and Six Months 
After Implementation 
To begin, I wanted to see if the standing order had any immediate 
effects.  Consequently, I investigated the six-month period before and the 
six-month period after implementation for each judge. 
1. Judge Casper Data:  Six Months Before and After Implementation 
Judge Casper adopted the standing order on May 16, 2011.  During the 
six months prior to implementation (December 20, 2010–May 15, 2011), 
112 lawyers appeared before Judge Casper at initial scheduling 
conferences.  Through the use of state bar and firm websites, I was able 
to determine when each lawyer who appeared before Judge Casper began 
practicing law.  In turn, I was able to calculate the experience level, 
rounded to the closest year, of the lawyer appearing at the conference.  
The mean experience level of lawyers appearing at initial scheduling 
conferences before Judge Casper before implementation is 18.5893 years, 
and the median is 17 years.  The standard deviation is 11.5955.  
I repeated these calculations for the six-month period after 
implementation (May 16, 2011–November 16, 2019).  During these six 
months, there were 89 lawyer appearances at initial scheduling 
conferences.  The mean for this period is 19.2584 years of experience, 
and the median is 18 years.  The standard deviation is 11.7364. 
Here is a bar-graph comparison of the two periods: 
 
 As demonstrated, the mean and median increased slightly.  So, these 
measurements do not show that experience level decreased before Judge 
17
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Casper post implementation.  To the contrary, those measurements 
increased slightly.  And the standard deviation remained roughly the 
same, meaning that that spread changed little. 
Based on those measurements, the standing order seemed to have no 
effect in the direction of having more junior lawyers appear.  But I also 
wanted to see whether there was an increase in how often lawyers who 
are in that “more junior” category were appearing.  Foremost, I had to 
define a more “junior lawyer” because the standing order does not.  I 
surveyed the orders across the country and, while there is some variation, 
nearly all of the orders define a more junior lawyer as an attorney with 
seven or fewer years of experience.80  I too used that definition. 
Of the 112 lawyers who appeared at initial scheduling conferences 
before implementation of the standing order, twenty of them had seven or 
fewer years of experience.  So 17.857% of the time, a “more junior” 
lawyer appeared before Judge Casper.  During the 89 proceedings post-
implementation, a more junior lawyer appeared eighteen times.  At 
20.225%, this is a slight increase. 
2. Judge Talwani Data:  Six Months Before and After Implementation 
I repeated the steps described above for Judge Talwani’s initial 
scheduling conferences for the six-month pre-implementation period 
(April 9, 2019–October 8, 2015) and the six-month post-implementation 
period (October 9, 2015–March 9, 2019).  The median, mean, and 
standard deviation results were similar to Judge Casper’s.  For the pre-
implementation period, the mean is 19.41379 years of experience; for the 
six months after implementation, it is 18.8.  As for the median, it went 
from 20 to 18 years of experience.  And the standard deviation stayed 
 
 80. See, e.g.,  Burke, supra note 7; ; Leigh Martin May, United States District Court for the 
Northern District of Georgia, Standing Order Re: Civil Litigation (Sept. 5, 2020),  available at 
http://www.gand.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/CVStandingOrderLMM.pdf; Miller, supra note 8;; 
Magistrate Judge K. Nicole Mitchell, United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas, Order 
(Jan. 18, 2017),  available at https://nextgenlawyers.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/Jr-Lawyer-
Order.pdf; Judge Michael J. McShane, United States District Court for the District of Oregon, 
Opportunities for Young Lawyers (Aug. 7, 2020),  available at 
https://www.ord.uscourts.gov/index.php/court-info/our-judges/judge-mcshane; Judge Alfred H. Bennett, 
United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, Court Procedures and Practices, available 
at https://www.txs.uscourts.gov/sites/txs/files/Bennett.pdf (last visited Sept.30, 2020); Judge Richard W. 
Story, United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, Standing Order Re: Civil 
Litigation (Mar. 1, 2017),  available at 
http://www.gand.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/RWS_Order_CV_Litigation.pdf; Judge Mark H. Cohen, 
United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, Standing Order Re: Civil Litigation 
(Sept. 5, 2018), available at http://www.gand.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/MHC_Standing_Order.pdf; 
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relatively consistent, going from 10.010 to 11.28661. 
Here are the measurements shown graphically: 
 
But again, I wanted to test the frequency with which “new lawyers” 
were appearing.  That measurement shows a more meaningful difference.  
During the six months before implementation, there were 84 lawyer 
appearances at scheduling conferences before Judge Talwani.  Only ten 
of those appearances were by more junior lawyers, for a percentage of 
11.904%.  During the post-implementation period, there were 177 lawyer 
appearances at initial scheduling conferences, and 37 of them were made 
by more junior lawyers.  That means that a more junior lawyer appeared 
20.90% of the time.  The percentage nearly doubled. 
3. Judge Mastrioanni Data:  Six Months Before and After 
Implementation 
As explained, I analyzed the data for the experience level of lawyer 
appearing before Judge Mastrioanni for all civil proceedings for the six 
months before and after he adopted the standing order.  There is the 
concern that the proceedings during these two periods are dissimilar.  
However, a review of the minute entries shows that, at least at a high level 
of generality, they tended to be the same sorts of proceedings like 
arguments on discovery matters and dispositive motions. 
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As I predicted, the experience level of the lawyers appearing at these 
proceedings was higher than at the initial scheduling conferences before 
Judges Casper and Talwani.  Before implementation, the mean was 
23.12727 years of experience; for the six-month period after it was 
22.22785.  Pre-implementation the median was 23, and after it was 22 
years.  So neither the mean nor the median changed much.  As for the 
standard deviation, it changed slightly, increasing from 10.65672 years to 
11.97672 years. 
The final question for this data is whether it shows a change in how 
often junior lawyers (seven years of experience or less) appear.  Of the 55 
lawyers who appeared before Judge Mastrioanni six months before the 
implementation of the standing order, only three were “newer lawyers”—
for a percentage of 5.455.  During the six months after implementation, 
there were 79 lawyer appearances with six by newer lawyers.  So, newer 
lawyer appearances increased to 7.595%. 
4. Summary of Data Six Months Before and Six Months After 
Implementation 
In sum, the data shows that the mean, median, and standard deviation 
of attorney experience in years stayed relatively consistent during the six-
month periods before and after implementation.  But there appears to be 









Judge Mastroianni: Experience Levels (in 
years)
Before Standing Order After Standing Order
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B. Longer Term Effects:  The Data from January 2019–June 2019 
Given that any trend towards having a more junior lawyer appear was 
mild, at best, just after implementation, I wanted to investigate next 
whether two other factors could make a difference.  The first is just the 
passage of time.  Additional time of course allows for more behavior 
adjustment.  This is so because counsel would need to become aware of 
the standing order, manage client expectations, and adjust case staffing.  
Second, by 2019, over half of the District Judges in the District of 
Massachusetts had adopted the order.  This coordination among judges 
most likely increases the expressive powers of the order.  Similarly, the 
adoption of various orders encouraging new-lawyer participation across 
the country have also enhanced the expressive force.81 
 
 81. Indeed, this movement is real. A very quick and very incomplete survey of just 20 federal 
courts revealed that nearly 50 federal judges have adopted such orders.  See Judge William Alsup,  United 
States District Court for the Northern District of California, Guidelines for Trial and Final Pretrial 
Conference in Civil Jury Trials Before the Honorable William Alsup (May 8, 2017), available at 
https://www.cand.uscourts.gov/wp-content/uploads/judges/alsup-wha/WHA-Standing-Order-for-
JuryTrials.pdf;  Burke supra note 7; Judge Edward J. Davilla, Uited States District Court for the Northern 
District of California, Standing Order for Civil Cases (May 3, 2019), available at 
https://www.cand.uscourts.gov/wp-content/uploads/judges/davila-ejd/EJD_Civil-Standing-Order.pdf; 
Donato supra note 47; Judge Yvonne Gonzales Rogers, United States District Court for the Northern 
District of California, Standing Order in Civil Cases (Apr. 2, 2019), available at 
https://www.cand.uscourts.gov/wp-content/uploads/judges/gonzalez-rogers-ygr/YGR-Standing-Order-
Civil_Apr-2019.pdf; Judge Andrew J. Guilford, United States District Court for the Central District of 
California, Scheduling Order Specifying Procedures, available at 
http://www.cacd.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/documents/AG/AD/Scheduling%20Order%20Specifyin
g%20Procedures.pdf (last visited Oct. 1, 2020); Judge Lucy H. Koh, United States District Court for the 
Northern District of California, Guidelines for Final Pretrial Conferences in Jury Trials Before District 
Judge Lucy H. Koh (Sept. 23, 2019), available at https://www.cand.uscourts.gov/wp-
content/uploads/judges/koh-lhk/Judge-Kohs-Standing-Order-for-Jury-Trials.pdf; Judge Barbara Lynn, 
United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas, Judge Specific Requirements, available at 
http://www.txnd.uscourts.gov/judge/chief-district-judge-barbara-lynn (last visited Oct. 1, 2020); May, 
supra note 80 ;  Miller supra note 8 ; Mitchell, supra note 80; Judge Kimberly J. Mueller, United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of California, Standing Orders, available at 
http://www.caed.uscourts.gov/caednew/index.cfm/judges/all-judges/5020/standing-orders; Judge Jon S. 
Tigar, United States District Court for the Northern District of California, Standing Order for Civil Jury 
Trials Before District Judge Jon S. Tigar (Aug. 26, 2019),  available at 
https://www.cand.uscourts.gov/wp-content/uploads/judges/tigar-jst/JST-Jury-Trial-Standing-Order.pdf; 
Judge Barry Ted Moskowiz, United States District Court for the Southern District of California, Civil 
Chamber Rules (Sept. 13, 2017), available at 
https://www.casd.uscourts.gov/Judges/moskowitz/docs/Moskowitz%20Civil%20Chambers%20Rules.p
df; McShane, supra note 80; Bennett, supra note 80; Judge Travis McDonough, United States District 
Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee, Judicial Preferences, available at 
https://www.tned.uscourts.gov/content/travis-r-mcdonough-united-states-district-judge;  Story, supra 
note 80 ;Cohen, supra note 80 ; Judge Timothy Batten, Sr., United States District Court for the Northern 
District of Georgia, Instructions to Parties and Counsel (Apr. 5, 2016), available at 
http://www.gand.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/TCB_Instructions.pdf; Judge Ann Donnelly, United 
States District Court for the Eastern District of New York, Individual Practices and Rules (Oct. 11, 2016), 
available at https://nextgenlawyers.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/AMD-MLR.pdf;  Judge Jack B. 
Weinstein, United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York, Individual Motion Practice 
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of Judge Jack B. Weinstein, available at https://img.nyed.uscourts.gov/rules/JBW-MLR.pdf; Judge 
Elizabeth A. Wolford, United States District Court for the Western District of New York, Junior Lawyers, 
available at https://www.nywd.uscourts.gov/content/hon-elizabeth-wolford; Judge Lorna G. Schofield, 
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, Individual Rules and Procedures for 
Civil Cases (Nov. 12, 2019), available at 
https://www.nysd.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/practice_documents/LGS%20Individual%20Rules%20
Civil%20%28updated%2011.12.2019%29.pdf; Judge Cathy Seibel, United States District Court for the 
Southern District of New York, Individual Practices for Judge Cathy Seibel (Sept. 4, 2018), available at 
https://www.nysd.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/practice_documents/CS%20individual%20practices%2
0v9%20090418.pdf ; Judge Analisa Torres, United States District Court for the Southern District of New 
York, Individual Practices in Civil Cases for Analisa Torres (Nov. 13, 2019),  available at 
https://www.nysd.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/practice_documents/AT%20Individual%20Practices%
20in%20Civil%20Cases%20-%20Final%2011.13.2019.pdf; Judge Kimba M. Wood, United States 
District Court for the Southern District of New York, Individual Rules & Practices of the Hon. Kimba M. 
Wood (Mar. 11, 2019), available at 
https://www.nysd.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/practice_documents/Individual%20Rules%20of%20Pr
actice%20-%20UPDATED%2003-11-19.pdf; Judge Gregory H. Woods, United States District Court for 
the Southern District of New York, Individual Rules of Practice in Civil Cases (Nov. 14, 2019), available 
at 
https://www.nysd.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/practice_documents/GHW%20Civil%20Practice%20R
ules%20November%2014%202019%20DRAFT.pdf; Judge Gene EK Pratter, United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, General Pretrial and Trial Procedures (Jan. 2020),  available at 
https://www.paed.uscourts.gov/documents/procedures/prapol2.pdf; Judge Mark A. Kearney, United 
States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, Policies and Procedure (Mar. 2020), 
available at https://www.paed.uscourts.gov/documents/procedures/keapol.pdf; Judge Michael Baylson, 
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, Judge Baylson’s Pretrial and Trial 
Procedures—Civil Cases (May 1, 2019),  available at 
https://www.paed.uscourts.gov/documents/procedures/baypol.pdf; Judge Pamela Chen, United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of New York, Individual Practice and Rules (June 14, 2020), 
available at https://img.nyed.uscourts.gov/rules/PKC-MLR.pdf; Judge Kiyo Mastumoto, United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of New York, Chambers Practices (Sept. 24, 2020),  available at 
https://img.nyed.uscourts.gov/rules/KAM-MLR.pdf; Judge Sanket Bulsara, United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of New York, Individual Practices of Magistrate Judge Sanket J. Bulsara, available 
at https://img.nyed.uscourts.gov/rules/SJB-MLR.pdf; Judge James Orenstein, United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of New York, Individual Practices of Magistrate Judge James Orenstein (Aug. 24, 
2017),  available at https://img.nyed.uscourts.gov/rules/JO-MLR.pdf; Judge Ramon E. Reyes, Jr., United 
States District Court for the Eastern District of New York, Motion and Individual Practice Rules of 
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1. Judge Casper Data:  January–June 2019 
For the first six months of 2019, the mean experience level of the 
lawyers appearing before Judge Casper at initial scheduling conferences 
is 20.3167 years; the median is 17.5 years; and the standard deviation is 
13.81725.  This graph shows a comparison of the three periods: 
The graph shows that the mean and median changed little, but there 
does seem to be a change in the standard deviation.  It has increased, 
which means there is a larger spread in 2019.  But most interesting is that 
for the first six months of 2019, there were 60 lawyer appearances at 
initial scheduling conferences before Judge Casper.  Seventeen of those 
were junior lawyers.  This means that 28.3% of the lawyers fit the bill.  







17.857% 20.225% 28.3% 
2. Judge Talwani Data:  January–June 2019 
The 2019 data for Judge Talwani shows that the mean is 23.03846 







MEAN  MEDIAN  STDEV
Judge Casper: Experience Levels (in years)
Before Standing Order 6 Months After Standing Order
January-June 2019
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This is similar to Judge Casper’s data in that the mean and median 
didn’t fluctuate too much—and even increased during the first six months 
of 2019, but the standard deviation increased. 
 For this period, there were 52 lawyer appearances before Judge 
Talwani, with seven of them being by junior lawyers.  That is a percentage 







11.904% 20.09% 13.46% 
3. Judge Mastrioanni Data:  January–June 2019 
The data for Judge Mastrioanni shows the same trends.  The mean and 
median stayed relatively consistent, and the standard deviation increased.  







MEAN  MEDIAN  STDEV
Judge Talwani: Experience Level (in years)
Before Standing Order 6 Months After Standing Order
January-June 2019
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There were 60 lawyer appearances in the first half of 2019.  Twelve of 
those appearances were by more junior lawyers.  That means that 20% of 







5.455% 7.595% 20% 
4. Summary of Data and Statistical Significance 
The above graphs show a few consistent trends.  First, the medians and 
means changed little.  But the standard deviations increased, as did the 
percentage of junior lawyers appearing. 
Therefore, I wanted to see how the probability of a junior lawyer 
appearing before one of these judges changed from pre-implementation 
to the first half of 2019.  During the pre-implementation era, the combined 
number of Rule 16 hearings for Judges Casper and Talwani and total 
hearings before Judge Mastrioanni was 251.82  At those hearings, a more 
junior lawyer appeared thirty-three times, or roughly thirteen percent of 
the time.  During the first half of 2019, the judges held 172 relevant 
hearings with junior lawyers appearing thirty-six times.  That yields a 
percentage of almost twenty-one.  So the percentage increased. 
But is this increase meaningful?  Statistical significance helps quantify 
whether a result is likely due to chance or to some other factor of interest. 
Said differently, measuring the statistical significance helps us determine 
 
 82. Recall that Judge Casper and Judge Talwani had other hearings as well, but for purposes of 
this analysis, only Rule 16 conferences are included. 
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if the change is merely random. 
To measure statistical significance, I calculated the z-score to compare 
the frequency rate of junior lawyers appearing before implementation of 
the orders to the frequency rate of such lawyers appearing in the first half 
of 2019.  A z-score measures a value’s relationship to the mean of a group 
of values, measured in terms of standard deviations from the mean.  Said 
differently, the z-score tells you the position of an observation in relation 
to the rest of its distribution. 






Yes 33 36 
No 218 136 
Total 251 172 
 Here, the z value is -2.1281, and the value p is .03318.  Applying a .05 
significance level, which is the generally accepted level, the changes are 
in fact statistically significant, supporting the conclusion that the standing 
order has at least partially disrupted the norm of not sending junior 
lawyers to court.  In other words, the increased frequency of junior lawyer 
participation is not simply by chance. 
V. CONCLUSION 
What does all this mean?  To start, the data shows that judges have 
power aside from their ability to sanction.  Again, to borrow from Cass 
Sunstein, judges are “norm entrepreneurs”—but not only when they are 
deciding questions of law or sanctioning parties.  Their entrepreneurial 
power extends beyond that.  In this particular circumstance, I suspect that 
the judicial standing orders provide cover to defect from the prevailing 
norm of sending senior lawyers to court.  Scholars have shown the same 
was true in early American history when anti-dueling laws barred duelists 
from elective office.83  Although it was gentlemanly to duel, it was also a 
gentleman’s duty to serve as an elected official.  So, says the gentleman, 
I will not duel so I can serve a higher calling of public office.  Likewise, 
the one who decides whether to send a more junior lawyer to court has an 
escape valve from the norm: the judge has expressed a desire for junior 
lawyers to appear.   
Some might say the judge’s ability to disrupt a norm is unsurprising 
given the role judges play in society.  But it is important to note that the 
increase in junior lawyer participation has not been earthshattering.  To 
the contrary, even at Rule 16 conferences—where we might expect to see 
 
 83. Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 943, 968-73 (1995). 
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more junior lawyers—the percentage never topped 29%.  And while 
Judge Talwani had a bump from just under 12% to over 20% during the 
first sixth months of implementation, that petered out to only 13.46% 
percent in 2019.  In other words, simple expression of a judicial 
preference does not turn the tide overnight. 
Next, in implementing standing orders, judges can and should learn 
from the literature on norms.  This is so because the scholarship can teach 
judges how to make their messaging more impactful—or less so if the 
moment requires.  The parallels between the scholarship on norms and 
standing orders work because both occupy the nebulous space where there 
is order but not law.  As an example, judges could learn from Richard 
McAdams’ work on esteem-based norms and the conditions necessary for 
their occurrence.84  Generally, McAdams posits that consensus and 
publicity are required for norm creation.85  The data above bears that out.  
Over time, more judges adopted the junior-lawyer preference (increased 
consensus) and presumably the bar grew increasingly aware of the 
preference (increased publicity).  Consequently, there was more 
compliance as consensus and publicity went up.  Formulating consensus 
and notifying the public also is consistent with the law.  Supra II.  
Interestingly, McAdams also identifies risk of detection as an important 
feature of norm development.  This is not an obvious aspect of the studied 
standing order.86  But some judges employ a Notice of Argument by 
Junior Lawyer.87  Such a notice would give counsel a sense that someone 
is monitoring compliance—the feature that McAdams says matters. 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, judicial messaging via standing 
orders deserves more attention and study.  As the analysis above shows, 
even a standing order that is not mandatory has an effect.  This type of 
study—and others that could be undertaken—has the ability to investigate 
whether laws and rules impact behavior not merely because of threat of 
sanction but because of their expressive powers.  As for standing orders 
that in fact threaten sanction for noncompliance, those, too, need 
 
 84. McAdams, supra note 11, at 358. In this article, McAdams offers the idea that, under the 
right conditions, the desire for esteem produces a norm. 
 85. Id. at 358–59. 
 86. Of course a judge could review someone’s biography online or guess at a lawyer’s 
experience level, but there is no immediate mechanism for detection.  Indeed, with the studied standing 
order, it’s arguably impossible to measure compliance because “junior lawyer” is not defined.  This of 
course is another way in which judges could enhance a standing order.  Besides, lawyers generally like 
clear instructions and rules. 
 87. See, e.g., Judge Sarah D. Morrison, United States District Court for the Southern District of 
Ohio, Standing Order, Re: Civil Cases, Opportunities for Newer Attorneys (Oct. 18, 2019), available at 
https://www.ohsd.uscourts.gov/standingordersJMorrison (“After a civil motion is fully briefed, any party 
may forthwith alert the Court by a docketed Notice that, if oral argument is granted, the noticing party 
intends to have a newer attorney (who has graduated from law school within the past six years) argue the 
motion (or a portion of the motion). 
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attention.  For one thing, such study could show whether the addition of 
a sanction is impactful to changing outcomes.  More generally, studying 
the power of judicial messaging complements our understanding of the 
judicial role.  And judges and society need to appreciate the aspects of 
judicial power to assure that power is being used thoughtfully. 
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